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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the potential of a lever type pitch trimmer to cause an overstress in light 
and microlight aeroplanes.  It concludes that this potential exists, and could potentially cause a 
catastrophic structural failure – with the evidence from one reported fatal accident suggesting that 
this may have already happened.  However, it is shown that this need not be the case, with 
restricted nose-up control authority, high manoeuvre stability, and the use of a trim wheel (as 
opposed to a lever) with a restrictive rate of control input shown as three methods, most likely in 
combination, by which this potential can be removed. Suggestions are made for airworthiness 




AAIB Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance 
AoD Aft of Datum 
CAS Calibrated Airspeed 
CG Centre of Gravity 
IAS Indicated Airspeed 
FL Flight Level (=sHp/100ft) 
kCAS knots CAS 
kias knots IAS 
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Chord 
MAP Manifold Air Pressure (expressed in inches of mercury / “Hg) 
MCP Maximum Continuous Power 
mias mph IAS 
MTOM Maximum Take-Off Mass 
N1 Lower speed positive normal acceleration limit for an aeroplane 
NZ Normal acceleration (also termed load factor) 
NZ.max Maximum normal acceleration (or load factor) experienced 
PEC Position and Pressure Error Corrections (between IAS and CAS) 
R2 Coefficient of determination, defining the quality of a line fit, 
has value R²=1 for perfect line fit, R²=0 for totally random 
distribution.  Defined by
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rpm Engine speed (revolutions per minute) 
sHp Standard Pressure Altitude (1013.25hPa subscale setting) 
VA Manoeuvre Speed 
VH Maximum achievable airspeed in level flight 
Vmin Minimum airspeed experienced 
VNE Maximum permitted airspeed in flight. 
VS0 Stall speed in the landing configuration 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The background and hypothesis 
 
A 2018 Air Accident report1 concerning a fatal accident to an EV97 Eurostar aircraft suggested a 
potential mechanism by which an aeroplane might be destroyed, although did not conclude that 
this was necessarily the cause of that accident.  Specifically it suggested that a sudden rearward 
movement of a lever type mechanical pitch trimmer might potentially cause normal acceleration to 
exceed aeroplane structural normal acceleration limits.  Potentially related, there has also been at 
least one other fatal accident in the same aircraft type where some undetermined occurrence did 
not cause a structural failure, but was of sufficient severity to project the pilot from the aircraft2. 
 
Obviously deliberately causing such an occurrence is inadvisable, and AAIB commissioned limited 
flight testing of an aeroplane similar to the accident aircraft in order to demonstrate the potential for 
that to occur.  This paper details a broader and independent investigation which further 
investigated this potential.  Four aeroplane types were flight tested: an EV97 Eurostar3 (similar to 
the original accident aircraft), a Scottish Aviation Bulldog 1204, a Grumman AA5a Cheetah5 and a 
Bölkow 209 Monsun 150FF6.  Of these types, only the Eurostar has a trim lever, all others used a 
trim wheel and thus whilst those other types are evaluated any conclusion is hypothetical, as if they 
had a lever rather than a wheel.  All four types tested had a similar (low wing, tractor single, side-
by-side, nosewheel, fixed gear) configuration although the Eurostar, Bulldog and Monsun are 
controlled with a stick, and the AA5a solely with a yoke. 
 
1.2 The operation of pitch trimmers 
 
There are several systems in use in light and microlight aeroplane cockpits to control the pitch trim 
function (most smaller aeroplanes not using roll or yaw trimmers – although of this sample the 
Bulldog does have a yaw trimmer); the most common is a trim wheel (Figure 2) necessitating 
relatively slow action from the pilot to make inputs; many microlight aeroplanes and sailplanes 
have trim levers and a few light aeroplanes, whilst examples of all aeroplane classes may use 
electric trimmers.  Again most commonly (and the case for all aeroplanes tested here) cables will 
then operate a trim tab set into the elevator. The pitch trim control is always used to set the hands-
off flying speed of an aeroplane, the normally taught method of use being to make that change 
initially with the primary pitch control (the yoke, or stick) and then to use the trimmer to remove the 
applied force at the primary control until that may then be released.  
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Figure 1. Pitch trim lever in Eurostar 
 
 




2.0 THE MAIN EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Data obtained 
CAUTION: The following section details tests carried out with due procedural care by qualified test 
pilots.  They should not be attempted by pilots or organisations unfamiliar with flight test technique 
delivery and associated safety planning. 
 
For each aeroplane, the following tests were carried out, flying at a representative weight and 
balance condition. 
 
[i] Wind-up turns7 were flown from a safe altitude and VH, accepting height loss where required, to 
identify the manoeuvre stability characteristics up to the highest value of normal acceleration that 
could reasonably be achieved. Normal acceleration reference was taken in the Bulldog and 
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Monsun from the cockpit g-meter, and in the other types from the “g-meter free” app on an LG V20 
mobile phone mounted vertically to the instrument panel. 
 
[ii] Tests were flown to evaluate the primary pitch control force which was required to maintain VH  
through the range of trimmer input. 
 
[iii] For the Eurostar and Bulldog, a racetrack8 method pitot-static calibration was carried out to 
determine airspeed indicator errors [for other types PEC data in the pilots operating handbook 
were used.] 
 
Note that in all four aeroplanes tested, VH was the maximum achievable speed with full throttle in 
level flight, which in all cases did not exceed the maximum power setting for the engine.  Many 
aeroplanes, including the Eurostar, have a lower power limit of Maximum Continuous Power or 
MCP which may be for reasons of extending engine life, providing a margin between VH and VNE, 
or reducing fuel burn and thus permitting an increased empty weight on weight-marginal 
aeroplanes (this last is common for high performance microlight aeroplanes particularly).  
However, given that no short term engine limitations would be exceeded, and that achieving 
periods of high speed level flight is both legally and practically possible in all aeroplane types 
above MCP, VH in this paper corresponds to full throttle, and not any lower published power limit. 
 
 
2.2 Analysis method 
For each aircraft, the data for manoeuvre stability were plotted and linear trendline formed, with 
extrapolation made out to ≈1.5N1.  The data for control force used to maintain speed with changes 
in trimmer input was also plotted and a quadratic curve fit made (for the Eurostar this quadratic fit 
was effectively linear, but retained for consistency).  These were then cross-plotted to provide an 
estimate of the normal acceleration which might potentially be generated, and indicate whether 
potential existed for a step nose-up trimmer input to cause a wing overstress. 
2.3 Considerations of data quality 
Only two of the aeroplanes were fitted with built in and certified g-meters – the Monsun and the 
Bulldog.  For the Eurostar and the AA5a a smartphone g-meter app (g-meter free on an LG V20 
phone) was used.  On the Monsun both were flown together, and throughout the normal 
acceleration range flown, the two agreed to within 0.1g, which was considered adequate for the 
purposes.  It was considered that all g-meter readings were in any case readable to about 
±0.05g. 
Graphs show a perhaps slightly conservative +/-0.1g error bar, +/-0.45daN (1lbf, based upon 
readability of the cockpit force gauge) and variable error bars for trimmer authority depending 
upon test pilot opinion of the ability to measure trimmer position in each aeroplane type. 
Airspeed is difficult to control in such manoeuvres, but this was simplified by the use of a single 
speed for all tests in each aeroplane.  In all cases, the test pilot judged that he was able to 
maintain conditions at the test point to within ±5kias at the point data were taken.  Inevitably 
altitudes did change during tests, but at all points within +200/-600ft of the stated condition. 
All tests (except for the simulated step trimmer inputs in the Eurostar) were flown by the same 
Test Pilot, who was current on the Monsun, Bulldog and AA5, and had prior experience on the 
Eurostar but flew for these tests with a safety pilot current and experienced on type.  Hours on 
type prior to the tests were: Monsun 4hrs, Bulldog 38hrs, AA5 210hrs, Eurostar 1hr. The 
Eurostar step-out-of-trim tests (“Second Eurostar”) were flown by a second test pilot with 500+ 
hours on type.  
 
GRATTON ON PITCH TRIMMER INDUCED STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
SUBMITTED TO THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 
Page 5 of 18 
 
3.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
3.1 Aircraft were tested at the conditions shown in Table 1  
Table 1 
Characteristics of each type as flown 
 







CG range flown 
 





Second Eurostar  
 
4.0 450 83.0-82.0 250-425mm AoD 
 
313-301mm AoD (mid-fwd) 










Monsun* 6.0* 680* 100-97.0 218.7-227 cm AoD 218.4-218.2cm 
(mid-fwd) 
 
3.2  Data for the Eurostar, which was tested at 1,900ft sHp, VH=130mias (109kCAS), 5,200rpm 
(using 5 minute power: maximum continuous power and thus VH are somewhat lower) are shown 
in Figure 3.  The pitch control force (stick force) to exceed N1 in the EV97 at the test condition was 
about 8daN, and to exceed this plus the standard 50% structural safety factor between limit and 
ultimate loads was 14daN.  The stick force to maintain flight speed at the test condition, if the pitch 
trimmer was deflected suddenly fully nose-up (to the back stop) was about 14 daN. 
 
The first figure is clearly approximated, since to conduct a fully representative test would be 
unsafe, but this indicates that a sudden full-rear deflection of the pitch trimmer would almost 
certainly cause the aeroplane to exceed N1 and shows significant potential to meet or exceed the 
ultimate load. 
 
                                               
* Aerobatic limits, within which the Bulldog and Monsun were operated for these tests. 
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Figure 3, Results for the EV97 Eurostar 
 
 
3.3 Data for the Bulldog, which was tested at 4,300ft sHp, VH=115kias [114kCAS], 25” MAP, 
2500rpm are shown in Figure 4; using a quadrilateral fit to the trim authority data and linear to 
manoeuvre stability this indicates that a sudden full nose-up trim input (which would not actually be 
 
 


























Trimmer position (on scale 0 to 1, 0=full aft, 1=fully forward
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possible due to the nature of the control) would create the equivalent of about 20 daN, which in 
turn would create a normal acceleration of about 5g.  This is within the 6g aerobatic limit for the 
aeroplane, and thus whilst it would be dramatic, would not risk structural failure.  It does seem not 
unlikely however that at a higher weight where the normal acceleration limit reduces to 4.4g,a 
structural limit might theoretically be exceeded, if the trim control permitted such an input. 
 
 
Figure 4, Results for Bulldog 120 
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3.4 Data for the Monsun, which was tested at 2,900ft sHp, VH=120kias, 2,600rpm is shown in 
Figure 5; using a quadratic fit to the trim authority data and a linear fit to the manoeuvre stability 
data.  This indicates that if it were possible, a step fully nose-up trim input would be equivalent to 
about a 15daN sudden back-stick pressure.  This in turn would create a normal acceleration about 









































Figure 5, Results for Bölkow B209 150FF Monsun 
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3.5 Data for the Grumman AA5a Cheetah, which was tested at 4,000ft sHp, VH=113kias 
[114kCAS], 2,650rpm are shown in Figure 6; using a quadratic fit to the trim authority data and a 
linear fit to the manoeuvre stability data.  This indicates that if it were possible, a step fully nose-up 
trim input would be equivalent to about a 45daN sudden back-stick pressure.  This in turn would 
create a normal acceleration about 4.5g, which is above the aeroplane’s 3.8g operating limit.  
However, the trim wheel required about 15 turns to move from the initial setting to the theoretical 
full back stick condition which was then tested on the ground and required about 11 seconds of 
vigorous input, during which period, in the air, aircraft flight conditions would change, including 
significant reduction in airspeed.  Therefore the aeroplane is protected by the nature of trim 
inceptor mechanisation, without which there might be a problem with this aeroplane – this is 
explored further in section 6. 
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Figure 6, Results for Grumman AA5a Cheetah 
 
 
4.0 Protection by the O-A Curve 
4.1 How the O-A Curve Works 
It is well known that the O-A portion of the classic V-N diagram “flight envelope” as shown in Figure 7 
is supposed to prevent an exceedence of N1 so long as an aeroplane is kept below VA9; the 
protection mechanism is that the aeroplane should stall before structural limits are exceeded.  Very 
high pitch rates will most likely delay the onset of the stall, however there is also a 1.5 safety factor 
(or greater) in most aircraft between the authorised flight envelope and ultimate conditions, and 
also airworthiness standards normally require that ultimate conditions can be withstood for at least 
2 seconds without any permanent deformation; hence that protection should remain. 
Above VA this protection does not exist, and aircraft are reliant upon a combination of piloting skill 
and judgement preventing overstress, and the extant safety factors.  Generally experience shows 
that this strategies are adequate – however it is definitely true that many aeroplane types can 
exceed VA in level flight, and virtually all aeroplane types can exceed VA in a dive. 
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Figure 7,  Typical basic flight envelope diagram (from CS.2310 - an applicable airworthiness standard for the Bulldog, Monsun and 
AA5a); apart from numeric limits, these diagrams do not vary significantly between airworthiness standards and this may be considered 
to apply equally to smaller (e.g. CS.VLA11) aeroplanes, as well military aeroplanes.  Microlights such as the Eurostar, unless relatively 
high performance, are certified in its entirety to BCAR Section S13 and will not consider gust loadings which, in any case, are irrelevant 
to the O-A curve.  Whilst this figure faithfully replicates the figure in CS.23, in fact VS on the O-A curve is at 1g and VA is at N1 (typically 
3.8g – 6.0g). 
 
4.2 Specifics 
Table 2 compares VH to VA for each of the aeroplane types tested. 
 
Table 2 









Eurostar 87 106 VH/VA=1.22.  As (1.22)²=1.48, likely no VA protection, even allowing 
for 1.5 structural safety factor. 
 
Bulldog 142 114 VH/VA=0.80.  The Bulldog is adequately protected by VA at least up to 
VH. 
 
AA5 105 114 VH/VA=1.09.  With (1.09)²=1.19 operating structural limits would be 
exceeded, but protection may be afforded by the 1.5 structural safety 
factor at FAR23.303. 
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The implication here is that some aeroplanes have sufficient margin at maximum level flight speed 
that even if there was a sudden nose-up control input, the aircraft is unlikely to exceed structural 
normal acceleration limits.  However, this is not universal – in the sample of four aeroplanes tested 
here, only two: the Bulldog and Monsun (both aerobatic, the higher g-limits thus increasing VA) will 
be thus protected.  However, the AA5 would exceed normal operating limits, and the Eurostar 
shows strong potential to exceed ultimate limits (being defined as the normal limit multiplied by the 
structural reserve factor, which is most commonly 1.5 or slightly greater). 
 
6.0 Aeroplane behaviour following rapid trim inputs 
 
6.1 Simulated step trimmer input (Eurostar) 
The impact of simulated step trim inputs were evaluated on a different EV97 Eurostar G-CEAM at 
mid-fwd (303-313mm) CG position and 370kg / 83% MTOM.  From VH (trimmer position 0.73, 
108kCAS, 4,000ft sHp), the trimmer was deflected, in the nose-up sense, in successive tests to 
positions 0.68, 0.63, 0.59, 0.54 and 0.5 whilst holding the aeroplane on condition using the primary 
pitch control.  The pitch control was then released, thus simulating a step trimmer input.  The 
results are shown in Table 3; these results specifically for maximum normal acceleration match 
closely the results for the other aircraft in Figure 3. 
Table 3 
Results of simulated step trimmer input at high speed – EV Eurostar 
Trimmer position NZ.max 
 
(g) 






Time at which Vmin 
occurred 
(s) 
0.68 1.3 3 85 17 
0.63 1.6 3 50 16 
0.59 1.9 3 25 16 
0.54 2.2 3 Pilot intervened to restore control at ~45˚ 
nose-up pitch attitude. 
0.5 2.5 3 Pilot intervened to restore control at ~45˚ 
nose-up pitch attitude. 
 
Results for this test do not indicate that speed bleed off was sufficient to prevent an overstress, 
and thus that characteristic does not provide significant protection. 
6.2 Simulated step trimmer input (AA5) 
In order to determine whether the relatively low mass and inertia of the Eurostar created particular 
responses to a step input, the above test was repeated with the AA5a only.  That was flown from 
VH (trimmer position 0.8), with the trimmer deflected to positions 0.7, 0.65 and 0.6 whilst holding 
the aeroplane on condition using the primary pitch control.  The pitch control was then released, 
thus simulating a step trimmer input.  Results are shown in Table 4. These results correspond closely 
to those in Figure 6 with regard to maximum achieved normal acceleration. The implication of this 
test is that whilst speed bleeds off with a step trimmer input, this happens substantially slower than 
the increase in normal acceleration.  Therefore the bleed off of speed is, to an even greater extent 
than for the Eurostar, too low in rate to provide structural protection. 
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Table 4 
Results of simulated step trimmer input at high speed – Grumman AA5 
Trimmer position NZ.max 
 
(g) 






Time at which Vmin 
occurred 
(s) 
0.7 1.5 1-2 62 (1.13 Vs) 20 
0.65 1.6 2 60 (1.09Vs) 12 
0.6 1.75 2 At ~15s, pilot intervened to restore 
control at 30-45˚ nose-up pitch attitude 
as stall speed was approached. 
 
The tests above were not repeated on the Bulldog or Monsun, whose characteristics sat between 
the Eurostar and AA5. 
 
6.4 Maximum rate input on a trim wheel (AA5) 
As has previously been noted, all types tested here except the Eurostar use a pitch trim wheel, not 
a lever.  On the ground (so with no air loads) from the high speed trim condition this takes about 11 
seconds to be moved the fully back position in the AA5. However in the air there will clearly be 
both air loads upon the system, and an aeroplane response.  So at the same VH [113kias / 
114kCAS, full throttle, 0.8 trim position] initial trim condition used for all other tests, the pilot 
released the primary flight controls and made the highest rate nose-up input to the pitch trim wheel 
that he was able.  As expected, this caused the aeroplane to pitch nose-up increasing normal 
acceleration and reducing airspeed. 
After about 8 seconds, the trimmer reached position 0.6, by which point speed had reduced to 
80kias, the aeroplane had pitched to an extremely unusual pitch attitude of about 45˚ nose-up.  
The g-meter registered a peak normal acceleration during this period of 1.5g, but this was 
transitory and by the 8 second point it was closer to 1.0 again.  At that point the pilot elected to 
regain normal control of the aeroplane by reducing power and pitching nose-down. 
The conclusion of this test therefore is that the use of a manual trim wheel, as enjoyed in this 
sample by the Monsun, AA5 and Bulldog (and whilst not tested, by the majority of other light 
aeroplanes such as the Piper PA28, Cessna 172, etc.) would appear to provide good protection 
from the overstress, and also the induced steep nose-up pitch attitude provides extremely clear 
cues to the pilot that the aeroplane was entering an undesirable set of flight conditions, and that 
they should make remedial control inputs.  Making such corrections did not require exceptional 
piloting skill: only inputs as would typically be taught to pilots in order to effect a “recovery from 
unusual attitude”12. 
 
7.0 How much trim authority is actually needed? 
An obvious question when considering the potential problems caused by excessive pitch trimmer 
authority, is how much nose-up trim authority is actually needed?  This was evaluated here on the 
Eurostar and the AA5.  With the main Eurostar aircraft at mid CG, it was found that the greatest 
requirement during these flights was in order to trim to approach speed powered (typically about 
1.3VS0) during final approach segment of the flight: about position 0.34.  With the second Eurostar 
at mid-fwd CG for a glide approach it was 0.23.  On the AA5 the critical case was the flapless take-
off, where the trimmed setting was about 0.3.   
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This would correspond on these two aeroplanes to about 3.8g and 4.4g (Eurostar) and for the AA5 
about 3.2g.  Therefore there is a strong indication here that aeroplanes may be being built with 
greater nose-up trim authority than is actually required for operational necessities. 
This is of course less straightforward than presented here, as both manoeuvre stability and trim 
authority are likely to vary in such aeroplanes with CG position and, to a lesser extent, with weight.  
However, they are also likely to vary in the same sense (that is, at both lighter weights and further 
aft CG both primary pitch authority and trim power will increase) so determination of a maximum 
required pitch trimmer setting would appear to be straightforward.  Once that was determined, the 
design solution may in some types, presumably, be a simple case of introducing a mechanical 
stop: the limited observations of this trial suggest that this may be the case for both the Eurostar 
and the AA5, although that is rather less clearcut for the Eurostar. 
 
8.0  Discussion: relationships to design codes 
The Eurostar microlight variant in the UK is approved using to BCAR Section S13, which at present 
is at issue 6, an excerpt from which is at Figure 8; that information is not accompanied by any 
associated interpretative material. 
 
Figure 8. Pitch trimmer requirements from BCAR Section S issue 613 
 
 
The history of airworthiness standard applicability for the other three types tested here is 
somewhat complex, but the present standard that would be applied to such aircraft is part 23, 
typified by CS.23 issue 410, from which Figure 9 is an extract.  The standard contains significant 
further interpretative material, but that concentrates upon the potential for a system runaway. 
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Figure 9. Pitch trimmer requirements from CS.23 issue 410 
 
The phrase “proper precautions must be taken to prevent inadvertent, improper or abrupt trim tab 
operation.” might reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting the use of a powerful trim tab lever that 
is located between seats where it might be accidentally operated.  However, the author was unable 
to find any evidence that this interpretation has historically been considered – for example the X’Air 
microlight aeroplane, which has an excellent safety record has such a trim lever, albeit further 
forward in the cockpit (Figure 10).  Reviewing certification reports for the X’Air it has a stick force/g 
of about 2.5 daN/g and nose-up pitch trimmer authority capable of trimming down to the stall, but is 
unable to sustain level flight above the VA of 65kCAS14, which would presumably provide good 
protection from overstress due to a step nose-up pitch trimmer input, as would the relatively 
forward position of the trim lever. 
GRATTON ON PITCH TRIMMER INDUCED STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
SUBMITTED TO THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 
Page 16 of 18 
 
 
Figure 10. Location of the pitch trim control lever in a Raj Hamsa X’Air cockpit (lever nearer camera is a throttle, black lever on left hand 
cockpit frame is an engine choke control). 
 
9.0 Conclusions 
This paper appears to confirm the proposal by AAIB that some aeroplanes, and in particular the 
EV97 Eurostar have a potential through a combination of pitch trimmer design, and the values of 
manoeuvre stability, VA, VH and pitch trimmer control power, to suffer an in-flight structural failure.  
However, this paper is not specifically intended to examine the problem of the Eurostar – or 
whether any other type has a problem, which requires more rigorous evaluation by the appropriate 
authorities. 
The major objective of this paper was to explore the potential of lever type pitch trimmers to cause 
overstress in a fixed wing airframe.  That case appears to be proven: a lever type pitch trimmer can 
cause airframe overstress in the following circumstances:- 
- A large step nose-up input is possible, and 
- The equivalent back-stick pressure due to the nose-up stick force per g (manoeuvre 
stability) gradient and trimmer authority being such as to permit N1 to be exceeded, and 
- The aeroplane is able to fly at a speed above VA such that N1 might be exceeded before the 
aeroplane stalls.   
It’s further concluded that speed bleed-off during pitch up, whilst it will occur, is unlikely to be of 
sufficient rapidity, unless proven otherwise, to provide any additional protection. 
However, it is also demonstrated that aeroplanes can be protected by one or more of the 
following:- 
- High manoeuvre stability (stick force per g) 
- Low trimmer power 
- The use of a slow moving pitch trim control that prevents sudden step inputs. 
- A manoeuvre speed sufficiently high that it is unable to be routinely exceeded.  This might 
be achieved through thrust/drag combinations that do not allow sufficiently high speed flight 
and/or a high positive normal acceleration limit. 
The author was unable to find previous discussion of this issue, although the fact that the vast 
majority of part 23 aeroplanes use a slow-moving trim wheel (such as that in Figure 2) suggests 
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that this may, in the past, have been “common knowledge” probably prior to 1950, but inadequately 
documented at that time, and thus has become lost knowledge. 
 
10.0 Potential for further work 
The results of this study have been passed to the British Microlight Aircraft Association, who are 
likely in collaboration with the Light Aircraft Association (airworthiness oversight of the EV97 
Eurostar is shared between the two organisations), manufacturer and other organisations to co-
ordinate further investigation and design changes to the Eurostar particularly. 
More generally however, this paper has indicated that a particular combination of pitch trimmer 
design and manoeuvre stability could allow aeroplanes to be overstressed by a sudden control 
input, and that there is a lack of clarity in airworthiness standards in regard of this potential.  It is 
not the place of an airworthiness standard to define how to ensure minimum safety standards, only 
to define what safety standards must be met.  It is suggested that some variation upon the 
following wording might advantageously be added to BCAR Section S, CS.LSA, CS.VLA, CS.22, 
most likely around paragraph 777 in all cases.  In the case of part 23 [CS.23 and FAR-23] this is 
probably impracticable because of ongoing moves towards a less prescriptive standard [reference9 
ch 1.3.1.2]. 
Trim controls shall be designed so that any normally achievable input cannot cause the aeroplane 
to exceed the normal acceleration limits defined in 337 at any permitted flight condition.  Where a 
control is capable of rapid inputs, this shall include maximum rate inputs to the control stop. 
However, the real value of this work should be in interpretation of best practice across light and 
microlight aeroplane testing – and for most standards this may involve inclusion of advice based 
upon this research in AMC (Acceptable Means of Compliance) or equivalent material.   
This paper tested to a maximum airspeed of VH; whether this is sufficiently conservative for 
certification, or testing should be extended to VNE would also bear investigation; the latter is clearly 
a safer solution, but whether this degree of conservatism is essential probably requires community 
debate to determine.  Similarly, where there is a significant difference between MCP and MTOP or 
full throttle, as with the Eurostar, this is also a necessary debate – as occurred when determining 
the test conditions for this paper. 
11.0 Flight Test Lessons Learned 
Following the convention used in papers published within the flight test community, the author 
wishes to note and explain two flight test lessons learned in the conduct of this research. 
- The simulation of a step nose-up pitch trim input by trimming nose-up whilst holding forward 
force on the primary pitch control, then releasing the stick was developed by the author and 
was successful.  However the use of small iterations towards what might be a structurally 
hazardous extreme, with continuous review of results, was deemed essential for safe 
conduct of the trial. 
- During deliberate nose-up trimming whilst holding and measuring forwards stick forces, the 
risk of an inadvertent control release and resultant overstress was significant.  Therefore 
the use of an observer “guarding” the controls on the other side of the cockpit was 
considered highly advantageous. 
As all flight was within the certified envelope for the four aeroplanes tested, technically this did not 
constitute a high risk trial.  However, given the nature of the testing: very careful iterative practices 
were followed, and all tests were flown by a qualified test pilot.  It was considered that the second 
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pilot guarding the controls was also beneficial, and their briefing by the test pilot was very specific – 
carriage of a true passenger would have been unacceptable.  A case could be made for solo flight 
with abandonment capability (i.e. a parachute) but the judgment formed here was that the safety 
pilot option was the better one. 
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